T
hose concerned with payments for health care services increasingly have sought numerical measures of the "quality of care" given by various providers. Outcome measures are one appealing source, provided they can be adjusted for case severity. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and California Medical Review, Inc. (CMRI), the California peer review organization (PRO), have used mortality data to measure the quality of hospital care. 1 This article reports on a study of risk-adjusted hospital mortality of nonelective surgical cases in Maryland, which could serve as a prototype for a risk-adjusted monitor of outcomes. 2 One major purpose of the study was to develop an adequate adjustment for patients' preoperative condition for a broad array of high-risk surgical procedures, using only regular hospital discharge abstract data. While more and better data will be developed in the coming years, hospital discharge abstracts are by far the most widely available computerized data for large-scale outcome studies. The second major purpose was to develop an approach to outcome analyses and reports that would be helpful not only to users of health care services (or their agents, such as the PROS), but also to the providers of services.
Subject Of Study
I sought a subject for study that both was important and had some promise of success using available computerized data such as hospital discharge abstracts. For several reasons, the hospital discharge data of the Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission were selected for study. Virtually all studies of surgical outcomes, including the landmark Stanford Institutional Differences Study (SIDS), have demonstrated that diagnosis and procedure codes are useful as risk predictors. 3 Uniform coding of these items and other risk predictors is desirable, and uniform protocol is used for collecting all Maryland hospitals' discharge data. Diagnosis and procedure have been related to hospital payment in the state for many years for all cases, giving further incentive for uniform coding. Also, the then executive director, Harold Cohen, shared my interest in developing risk-adjusted outcomes from these data.
One of our key decisions was how to select the surgical procedures for analysis. While study of one or more selected procedures is useful, the relatively small number of postoperative deaths and low-and mediumvolume hospitals limits the applicability of specific procedures for monitoring outcomes at many hospitals. Increasing the number of procedures studied and summing the results of these procedures would increase the numbers of expected adverse events at each hospital. However, developing specific models, for each of a large number of procedures (hundreds) not only would involve a great deal of work but also would be impractical 64 HEALTH AFFAIRS | Spring 1988 for many small-volume procedures with too few total cases for a procedure-specific model. We chose to include as broad an array of procedures as we could, being limited only in our ability to model the risks with the available discharge abstract data.
Our Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission database consists of a computer tape of coded abstracts of discharges from all Maryland hospitals for the year ending March 31, 1985. The literature review and a prior pilot study had shown that, for any given procedure, elective (that is, scheduled) surgical cases had a far lower mortality rate than nonelective cases. The term "elective" is often interpreted as if it pertained to the decision to operate, but it more typically pertains to the ability to schedule the time and place for a given procedure. Because of the importance of the "type of admission" variable, we developed some test procedures to find invalid coding in this field (for example, emergency bunionectomies, elective appendectomies). Ten Maryland hospitals were inconsistent in coding type of admission, and their data for 18 percent of the state's surgical cases and deaths were omitted from subsequent analysis.
The surgical cases of the remaining forty-four hospitals were further reduced by omitting some types of procedures, including: cases in which open-chest heart massage for cardiac arrest was the only procedure (those cases that had another surgical procedure prior to the open-chest heart massage were not omitted); procedures for surgical complications, such as control of postoperative hemorrhage; obstetric delivery cases, since they rarely died in the hospital; and cases with a diagnosis of secondary malignancy. 4 Of remaining surgical cases, 101,407 were elective admissions, with 362 deaths for a death rate of 0.36 percent, and 52,865 were nonelective admissions, with 2,090 deaths for a death rate of 3.95 percent. Since the great majority of deaths of surgical cases were concentrated among these nonelective cases, we chose to analyze them in more detail.
The next step was to determine the death rate for each procedure. Those procedures with the highest death rates were selected for further study. This left 8,745 surgical cases with 1,272 deaths, for an average death rate of 14.6 percent. The 250 different procedures included in these cases each had a Maryland death rate of about 6 percent or more.
The essence of risk adjusting outcomes of care is to stratify cases into categories prognostic of the outcome, using information on each patient's condition prior to the health care service being monitoredsurgery, for example. 5 A limited set of fields from the discharge abstract was used as the source of our predictor variables. 6 Reducing the over 250 different surgical procedures and an even greater number of diagnoses in our set of cases was a challenge. Much of the popularity of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) is that they reduce SURGICAL QUALITY IN MARYLAND 65 thousands of diagnoses and procedures to under 500 categories. However, analysis of DRGs showed them wholly inadequate as substitutes for diagnoses and procedures to risk adjust surgical mortality.
A simple and effective way to use diagnoses and procedures as risk predictors is to sort them by their adverse outcome rates. We arrayed the Maryland death rates for all surgical procedures in this data set by descending order of their hospital death rates. We then divided these procedures into six fractiles, ranging from those with the highest to those with the lowest death rates, which we used as predictor variables. In addition, a number of specific procedures for particular body systems (such as head or chest) were grouped by their relative death rates.
Since it is essential to limit risk predictors to those present prior to surgery, we had to distinguish diagnoses present on admission from those that may have developed during or following surgery. We assumed that all principal diagnoses were present on admission since this is explicit in their definition. We then arrayed these principal diagnoses by their Maryland death rates and divided them into six fractiles to use as risk predictors. Other predictors were based on subsets of principal diagnoses for selected body systems and also grouped by death rates. For all other diagnoses (that is, excepting the principal diagnoses) only chronic conditions and trauma were used as risk predictors, since we could not determine from the abstract whether other acute conditions were present at admission or developed as a complication. Data from other fields were used as predictor variables, with the dates of admission and of surgery subtracted to develop a preoperative days variable.
We wanted a statistical procedure that could find the most useful combinations of this candidate set of predictor variables and selected the CART recursive partitioning computer program. 7 In our model we have 121 EROGs (Equal Risk of Outcome Groups) analogous to DRGs, which had death rates ranging from 0 percent to over 80 percent. Like DRGs, these EROGs are exhaustive and mutually exclusive (that is, every case belongs in one and only one category).
The expected death rate for each patient in a given EROG was equal to the observed death rate for the EROG. For any set of cases, these expected deaths were then summed and compared with the observed deaths in the same set. This method made the statewide average death rates in each EROG for the Maryland hospitals in our data set as the "standard" to which each case was compared. Some of the implications of selecting the average as the standard are discussed below. difference of the observed and expected deaths on each line occurring by chance alone. The greater the value of chi 2 , the less likely that a difference between the observed and expected deaths was due to chance variation. Thus, a chi 2 of 4 or more usually warrants some additional review but does not indicate significance when such a large number of comparisons are made. 8 The ISMR, the indirectly standardized mortality ratio, is the ratio of observed deaths to expected deaths. Values over 1.00 are unfavorable compared to the Maryland average standard, while those under 1.00 are favorable. The expected death rate per 100 cases is a useful measure of the "case-mix severity."
Only three hospitals in Exhibit 1 have substantial differences between observed and expected deaths; two are favorable (14 and 30), and one is adverse (32). The hospitals are arrayed in descending order of their numbers of cases, but there is no evidence in this exhibit that those with a higher volume of cases have more favorable outcomes. However, most of the studies that support such volume effects are for specific procedures, not the broad array included here. A similar analysis by hospital, but limited to cases with a principal diagnosis involving trauma, showed even smaller interhospital variations in observed versus expected outcomes, and none was substantially different from the state average. Over half of our surgical trauma cases were admitted to the University of Maryland, which is the state's major trauma center. Its risk-adjusted outcomes were similar to other hospitals even though it had riskier-than-average trauma cases; its expected death rate was 20.1 percent, while at other hospitals it was only 13.8 percent.
We grouped cases by surgical category (for example, cardiovascular, gastrointestinal) and found only modest differences between observed and expected numbers of deaths for some of them, but all categories were within the range expected by chance variations. This suggests that our overall risk predictor model can be used to compare hospitals for the different surgical categories. Exhibit 2 gives information by surgical category for selected hospitals. This detail provides some useful insights. For example, hospital 12 was only slightly adverse for its cases overall but substantially adverse for cardiovascular surgery. Exhibit 2 also can help to point out the major services contributing to good outcomes. Thus hospital 4 was somewhat favorable for all its cases, but very favorable for digestive system cases. This exhibit format should be particularly helpful to hospitals wanting more information on their risk-adjusted outcomes.
To provide data in a format that might help those purchasing care, we rearranged the data for each surgical category. Exhibit 3 presents data on nontrauma digestive system procedures by hospital. It shows that hospitals 7 and 39 are quite adverse, while hospital 34 has the best adjusted outcomes for these cases.
With sufficient cases, even more detailed procedure and diagnosis deaths for gastrointestinal surgery cases at these two hospitals was due to the same two-digit diagnosis (53) diseases of the esophagus, stomach, and duodenum. A sort by the five-digit diagnosis codes revealed that at both hospitals this surgery was primarily for stomach and duodenal ulcers with hemorrhage or perforation. Providing hospitals with such detailed statistics on their apparent good and bad outcomes is an essential aspect of validating and applying an effective monitoring system. Unlike models having the hospital as the unit of observation, each case in our data set is classified by its risk of death in the hospital. 10 Because the model is case-specific, it is simple to compare the observed with the expected deaths for any subset of cases. The foregoing analyses by detailed procedure and diagnosis codes at specific hospitals are only one example. We also sorted all the nontrauma surgical cases by week of the year in which they were admitted and divided the weeks into three categories: (1) those that included any days in July; (2) those that included a national holiday (except July 4); and (3) all other weeks. Exhibit 4 shows that, for all hospitals, the weeks with national holidays had substantially more deaths than expected (chi 2 =4.65), while the other two time periods showed negligible disparities. The major teaching hospitals were substantially adverse in July (chi 2 =4.14, or 32 observed versus 22.4 expected deaths), while all other hospitals were a little favorable in this month. (Almost all resident doctors at teaching hospitals have new responsibilities in July.) A more detailed review of the national holiday weeks showed that the excess of deaths was linked almost entirely to one major teaching hospital and to those nonteaching hospitals that were not part of the state trauma system. Analysis of the trauma cases showed that there were no important differences in outcomes for the three categories of weeks and type of hospital. We also were interested in patterns of outcome differences by day of the week. One major hospital had an excess of observed deaths for nontrauma surgery performed on Saturdays. For nonteaching hospitals, nontrauma cases with expected death rates ranging from 23 percent to 46 percent were adverse for Wednesday admissions (34 observed deaths versus 24.02 expected deaths, chi 2 =4.14). The results of this analysis have some logical basis, since Wednesday afternoons are typically a time off from physician practice in Maryland. Even the U-shaped relationship of expected death to Wednesday risk is logical, since lower-risk cases would be less susceptible to delay while the highest-risk cases would make prompt care more mandatory.
From a statistician's viewpoint, this type of sequential pursuit of explanations for outcome disparities virtually eliminates the usual tests of significance, but nonetheless such "detective" work has proven valuable to hospitals by helping them to pinpoint potential problems. If need be, the system allows abstracts of the cases in specific categories to be listed for providers and others concerned with verifying and understanding the statistics.
We chose not to use data on race as a risk predictor, for if it had been included in the risk model then there could have been separate standards for each race. This would have prevented any meaningful comparisons of risk-adjusted outcomes by race. Thus, the fact that it was not a risk factor allowed us to see whether there were any differences in outcome by race. For both whites and all others the observed deaths equaled the expected. This was true at large teaching, other teaching, and nonteaching hospitals alike. Overall, whites had an expected death rate of 14.86 percent, while the other races had an expected rate of 13.75 percent. Since these rates are a "severity" measure, the results are somewhat at odds with the conventional wisdom that, on average, hospitalized whites are lower in risk than other races are.
While place of care has been the center of interest in outcome studies, there is now great interest in how the source of payment may influence outcomes. The case-specific nature of our model allows this to be studied directly, provided that the source of payment is accurately and uniformly coded for each case. Exhibit 5 presents data for all our cases (trauma and nontrauma) sorted by source of payment. Observed Medicaid deaths were essentially equal to those expected from the statewide standards for cases with similar risks. The data for all hospitals indicates that observed deaths of Blue Cross cases were favorable, with most of this advantage in nonteaching hospitals. This is puzzling, particularly ues to study only Medicare cases, it will never be able to compare Medicare outcomes with those of other payers. Self-pay cases were particularly adverse in teaching hospitals, which may reflect different conventions or circumstances for assigning cases to the self-pay categories in teaching and nonteaching hospitals.
Is The Model Useful?
We have noted several cases of substantial differences between observed and expected deaths. In addition to variations in the effectiveness of care, there are several explanations for these disparities: problems with data, risk predictors, model bias, and chance variations.
First, adequate data are essential for an effective model. There were very few missing data in the Maryland discharge abstracts for the cases we studied. We tested the reliability of coding at each hospital for type of admission; checked to see whether our study hospitals used a fifth digit on coma duration in cases when it was allowable; made many checks on cases that appeared unusual in some attribute; and corrected some obvious coding errors. About three-fourths of our time on the project was spent in checking the data, but we lacked software that could systematically check many aspects that we did laboriously by inspection of computer data from individual cases.
Second, the availability and selection of risk variables are another source of problems. We believe that we were quite careful in excluding diagnoses that were not present on admission. However, given the limited set of patient characteristics used as predictor variables, it is probable that some potentially important variables were omitted. There is no easy way to determine the effect of such omitted variables without comparing models that include them to those that exclude them. Oddly enough, variables that are purported to be included in risk models may not be fully adjusted for by a model. We have tested our model against all predictor variables available to the model and have not found any that were inadequately adjusted. We even tested our model for detailed procedure and diagnosis codes and found that it adjusts for them surprisingly well.
Third, a risk model may be biased for or against higher-risk cases. It is quite common for models to understate the risk of high-risk cases and to overstate the risk of low-risk cases. We have tested for this and believe that any such biases in our model are minimal in magnitude.
Fourth, differences in observed and expected deaths may be due to chance variation alone, particularly when the expected values are small. Although we used some statistical measures (chi 2 or the confidence interval of the Poisson distribution) of the disparities between observed and expected deaths, these do not resolve the issue. Standard statistical measures of significance are inapplicable because of the many comparisons we made. We can only indicate whether any given difference is more or less likely to have occurred by chance than any other given difference.
Due to the many competing "severity measures" there is intense interest in comparing them to determine their relative merits as variables to predict both costs and outcomes of care. These severity indices are evaluated both by themselves and as supplements to the DRGs. The major criterion in judging them seems to be the amount of variance that they explain, usually expressed as the correlation coefficient or r 2 between the observed rate of an outcome and the expected rate of the outcome in various sets of cases stratified by predicted risk.
While relevant, this does not address other potentially serious problems of severity indices. The most widely used severity index, the DRGs, illustrates some of these problems. DRGs understate relative costs for those with above-average weights and overstate costs for DRGs with weights below average. This bias is known, but euphemistically called "compression."
12 A second problem with DRGs is the ability to further divide a given class by use of available predictor variables. Thus, many surgical DRGs can be sorted readily into two categories by whether or not the case was scheduled, with the scheduled cases having a much lower average cost than the unscheduled cases. The DRGs can be sorted similarly by the age of the patient into categories that vary by their cost within DRG. At the least, these two important criteria should be used for evaluating various severity indices.
Successful testing for some of the potential problems outlined above still does not assure that a risk-adjusted model is useful. In a Journal of the American Medical Association editorial, Lincoln Moses, a statistician with long experience in risk-adjusted outcomes of hospital care, suggests a test of the usefulness of risk-adjusted outcome statistics: "After six months or a year has elapsed, let a sample of the hospitals be contacted, or even visited, to find out what, if anything, was done in response to the information. Try to identify what measures worked well and what did not. Find out how the information returned to the hospitals could be made more useful to them. Try to understand better how to facilitate and assist within-hospital forces for self-improvement." 13 The issue raised by Moses is a crucial one, but it may be difficult to obtain confirmation of the usefulness of the statistics by his method. We sorely lack a "gold standard" by which one can test a statistical model that shows disparities between observed and expected outcomes. We have provided detailed data from our study to several Maryland hospitals, but confirmation of the data has been limited. Suppose a hospital has been reported as having an excess of risk-adjusted deaths in a given department. One of its first responses would be to review charts of these deaths and try to identify errors in the process of care and the outcomes 14 Most cases with errors in care recorded in the chart have successful outcomes. While some cases have both an inadequate process of care and a bad outcome, there are others with bad outcomes but no apparent errors in care. A one-time intensive care unit nurse at a Maryland hospital has been charged with causing cardiac arrests and deaths of many of her patients by injecting potassium into their intravenous lines. A diligent review of the charts revealed so little of the matter that the prosecutor had to rely on epidemiologic statistics to show how unlikely it was that chance alone could have caused these events. 15 Thus a simple chart review of those with bad outcomes often will fail to validate outcome statistics. The problem is made even more difficult when one wishes to confirm outcome statistics indicating that a hospital has done particularly well. Does one then review all the charts with a successful outcome to find out what was done that prevented an expected death?
In practice, most hospitals will be somewhat reluctant to reveal anything that confirms statistics indicating an excess of adverse outcomes. There is considerable precedent for the staff to rationalize or deny any care implications of unexpected deaths. 16 Some fairly elaborate steps may have to be taken to assure the confidentiality of the confirmatory process by those hospitals willing to undertake it. In contrast, hospitals with favorable outcome statistics will tend to accept them at face value and may even commend the process by which they were derived.
It may be asking a lot of even a cooperative hospital to have it explain its overall adjusted death rates. The more detailed the information provided to the hospital, the greater the likelihood that it can provide confirmation. The analyses above by month of the year, by day of the week, and by specific diagnosis and procedure codes are illustrations of the type of detail likely to be useful to hospitals. The typical hospital is not in as good a position to conduct such analyses by itself as is the organization having all the data used to prepare the outcome statistics. Hospitals will have to be able to request and obtain more specific reports from the organization to follow up on hunches they may have regarding the cause of disparities between observed and expected outcomes. In summary, despite its import, the fair-minded appraisal of outcome studies sought by Moses may well take a long time to achieve.
Mosteller, another noted statistician and a colleague of Moses on hospital outcome studies, recently editorialized that: ". . . the whole process of designing, executing, and interpreting such {outcome risk} adjustments must be regarded as iterative as we learn the pitfalls and peculiarities of adjustment methods when used for such [hospital) comparative purposes." 17 The process of preparing, validating, and perfecting risk-adjusted outcome models is likely to be lengthier than many advocates assume. Furthermore, progress will be uneven, with some aspects becoming useful before others, largely due to data problems.
Given the important decisions that are likely to be based on outcome data, some independent high-level group should be given the responsibility of certifying that an outcome model is sufficiently useful to be applied under specified circumstances.
Data Needs
While there are many problems in developing successful monitors of outcomes, the most serious limitation for the near future is the accuracy, completeness, and relevance of the existing data. Two types of data are essential for risk-adjusted models of outcomes. The first and more important is the data on the outcome. Inhospital death is reasonably well reported in the hospital chart and the abstract, although HCFA, in its 1986 outliers data, had substantial problems with some states. 18 In many ways, death within thirty days of admission is more useful, but out-ofhospital deaths require data from other sources to be merged with the hospital abstract. There are many other outcomes of interest, but their notation in hospital records is variable and often incomplete. Thus, nosocomial infections are grossly underreported, as are many surgical complications and other therapeutic misadventures. Top priority should be given to obtaining databases with complete and accurate reporting of important adverse outcomes.
The second obvious need is for data that are adequate for use as risk predictors. One aspect of this issue is how to make effective use of data that are already routinely included in computerized hospital abstracts. To assure uniformity, coding manuals must be developed for variables in addition to diagnosis and procedure. To monitor the quality of data, there is urgent need to develop and use software that can check on the validity of coding, particularly for diagnosis and procedure. Some way must be found to distinguish acute conditions present on admission from those that develop as complications during the course of care.
While better-quality data would be helpful, additional computerized data also will be needed. The accurate coding of some signs, symptoms, medications, and diagnostic test results reflecting admission status is the essential and most costly aspect of several severity indices (for example, MEDISGroups, CSI, APACHE). 19 Since it is still impractical to abstract everything on everyone, there is a need to select subsets of such clinical information that are most pertinent to particular types of cases (for instance, electrocardiograms for heart conditions, chest x-rays for pneumonia). The question of how to deal with cases missing some "required" diagnostic tests could have serious cost implications. Some providers will be encouraged to do more tests if this results in a higher severity for their cases than does omitting the tests.
The cost of obtaining a computerized data set suitable for risk adjust- While the average outcomes of all cases in Maryland in a given category were used here as a standard, other approaches are possible. After looking at preliminary risk-adjusted outcomes, one might identify some providers that were so much worse in their outcomes that they should be excluded from the standard. Alternatively, one might use a standard based only on those providers with the best-adjusted outcomes. Having a national database would give more flexibility in selecting subsets of hospitals to serve as a standard, since the volume of cases for analysis should be increased. However, having separate standards for each of several classes of hospitals, such as numbers of beds or ownership, would completely defeat the ability to compare adjusted outcomes of hospitals. The risk adjusters must be based on patient characteristics, not on provider attributes.
In my opinion, the additional data collected for many severity indices are not only their most costly feature but also their most useful one. With computerized data, the methods used to score these data can be readily changed. I doubt that any one severity index can be used successfully to measure relative costs and outcomes for a broad variety of cases, medical and surgical. While a common data set might be used for adjusting many outcomes, the combinations of cases in different categories and the weights assigned to them should differ for various outcomes.
For these reasons, we urgently require a national strategy to select those additional data elements that are most valuable for the many cost and quality issues that are now so pressing. At present, the lack of clear national leadership is a great barrier to progress. While the marketplace is a useful way to meet the needs of many diverse consumers, it is an unpromising way to achieve national uniformity. HCFA has played a dominant role in improving hospital data, particularly since the inception of DRG-based payments, but its interest in Medicare limits its concern for some important services such as obstetrics and newborns. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations has made a policy decision to give some emphasis to outcomes of care and could also become a leader in creating the data needed to implement this policy. 20 Various state agencies are in a good position to make data uniform within their states, but obtaining national uniformity will require some organization such as the National Association of Health Data Organizations (NAHDO) to encourage the various states to agree.
In summary, we should use the existing databases for selected outcome applications where they are useful and think carefully to determine what additional data would be worthwhile for our future needs. Thus, discharge abstracts probably contain sufficient information to risk adjust most surgical cases, but additional clinical information will be needed for most medical cases. Unhappily, many well-meaning but rather naive people who provide guidance on measuring outcomes believe that one or another severity index can resolve the many complex data and model problems. The step-by-step incremental approach advocated by both Moses and Mosteller is much more promising and realistic.
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